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Statement of the Issues 
1. Whether appellee has effectively defended the position that the court erred by granting 
appellee's motion for summary judgment when there was clearly a material factual dispute as 
to whether appellant's mother intended to presently deliver the quitclaim deed that she sent 
via certified mail from Utah to appellant while he was in California, and that such deed was 
on its face an absolute conveyance. 
2. Whether appellee has defended that the trial court erred by summarily ruling that a 
1 
DEAN W. CROWTHER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee 
vs. 
BRYAN MOWER, 
Defendant-Appellant 
deed not recorded by grantee does not convey to the grantee the grantor's ownership interest 
in the property that is the subject of the deed, and thus does not destroy a joint tenancy with 
right of survivorship until the deed is recorded. 
3. Whether the appellee has defended that the trial court erred by granting appellee 
attorney's fees even though appellant was named as the defendant in appellee's action to quiet 
title, and appellant merely showed up in court to argue why appellant's deed, conveyed from 
his mother to him was valid, and appellant made this argument in good faith and defended it 
very well by both fact and in law. 
Statement of Case 
In appellee's statement of the case in his brief, page 4 and 5, the statements are made 
that: appellant's "answer and defense was knowingly not well-grounded in fact or warranted 
by existing law and lacks good faith...[appellant's] documents are largely unintelligible and 
contain erroneous legal half-truths, none of which are well grounded in fact or warranted by 
existing law. " It is the contention of this reply that appellee has not provided one case or one 
statute supporting his positions. In fact, all appellee has done is present opinions 
unsubstantiated by law. 
Detail of Argument 
Summary Judgment is Improper When a Dispute to a Material Fact Exists 
The appellee stated that "it is fundamental that summary judgment should be granted 
where there is 'no genuine issue as to any material fact."' Clearly there is an issue of fact in 
this case and the granting of the summary judgment in favor of the appellee, turned on an 
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issue of fact, not law., therefore, the granting of the motion for summary judgment should be 
overruled because in order for a nonmoving party to successfully oppose a motion for 
summary judgment and send the issue to a factfinder, it is not necessary for the party to 
prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for the nonmoving party to show facts that 
controvert those of the moving party's* Salt Lake City Corp v. James Constructors Inc., 761 
P. d 42 (Utah Cr. App. 1988). 
The appellee also stated that "the controlling, undisputed facts in this case revolve 
around the letter of W. Paul Wharton, (Mrs. Crowther's Attorney) dated December 16, 1988. 
Appellee is incorrect in this opinion. The controlling, undisputed fact in this case is the deed 
itself, which is a "Legally Binding Contract" that was signed by Mrs. Crowther on December 
15, 1988, witnessed, notarized and sent via certified mail to Mr. Mower which at that time, 
according to the law (see appellant's brief), severed Mrs. Crowther's joint tenancy with 
appellee. Appellant had become a tenant in common with appellee when he was conveyed 
the property, two and 1/2 years before Nellie Crowther died. 
Other controlling, facts in this case include the letter mention by appellee which 
indicates Mrs. Crowther's intention: "I (Mr. Wharton) am forwarding the two deeds to you, to 
complete the transaction by which she (Mrs. Crowther) transfers ownership to you (Mr. 
Mower). "; and the codicil to the will in which Mrs. Crowther states: "I have by quit-claim 
deed, given to my son (Mr. Mower) one-half of my home and other real property." 
These are clearly controlling facts that indicate a clear intention to sever joint tenancy with 
Mr. Crowther and convey interest to appellant. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, on at least two occasions, has clearly stated that a 
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grantor's intent to deliver a deed is not one of law, rather one of fact. In Horton v. 
Horton, 695 P.d 102, 106 (Utah 1984) the Court ruled: Delivery or its absence is a question 
of fact." See also: Poulson v. Poulson, 672 Rd 97, 99 (Utah 1983). In light of these rulings 
by the Utah Supreme Court, the trial judge was clearly wrong by granting summary judgment 
on the factual issue concerning Nellie Crowther's intent to transfer ownership when she 
conveyed her property to her son, Mr. Mower. 
A Deed Not Recorded by a Grantee Does Not Effect the 
Validity of the Conveyance Between the Grantor and the Grantee 
Appellee state on page 7 of appellee's brief that "the failure to record the deed for 
some two and one half years is fatal to appellant's case." However, appellee fails to provided 
case law or statutes to support his opinion. Appellant has supplied over 11 cases and a statute 
(see appellant's brief page 12-19) indicating that recording adds nothing to a deed's 
effectiveness as a conveyance; all that it accomplishes is to impart notice and after its 
acceptance, failure to record the deed will not revest title in the grantor. ( 23 Am Jur d, 
Deeds sections 76 et seq.) 
Appellant, by law, was a tenant in common with appellee as of December 15, 1988 
and had the option to record or "serve notice of his claim" any time he chose. Appellee has 
not supplied any documents thus far including case law or statutes supporting his opinion. 
Appellee claimed that appellant has not filed an affidavit of impecuniosity and by 
failing to do so, has violated rule 11 and rule 40(a), U.R. App. P. Appellant asserts that all 
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documents filed are legal and responsible and appellant has acted in his own behalf quite well 
utilizing the standard of law, procedure and protocol in all aspects of the case. In addition, 
appellant's actions were not frivolous and, by all standards, meritorious. 
Conclusion 
The attorney's fees granted originally, were an abuse of discretion because Mr. 
Mower's defense was asserted in good faith and was well grounded in both fact and law. 
Appellant should, therefore, prevail on all issues presented and this court should give full 
force and effect to all provisions dpthe Utah Laws, cited in appellant's brief and reverse the 
District Court's original decision. 
Respectfti^ Submitted, 
•A 
Bryan D. Mower 
Pro Se 
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